Calling the ongoing Russian-Ukraine conflict anything other than the worst crisis since World War II is a betrayal of truth. This conflict has all the hallmarks — global stakeholders, historic animosity, the nuclear rhetoric, economic interests — that could potentially snowball into a world war. However, as an optimist, I believe — and hope — that it won’t come to that. At the same time, it is important to spare a thought to how this crisis is impacting nations like India, which have resorted to nonpartisanism, neither condoning nor condemning Russia’s aggression.

 

India’s balancing act has not gone down well with the West, which is trying to rally nations against Russia. After India abstained to vote on the Security Council Resolution against Russia’s actions, many self-styled political analysts were quick to pounce on India, saying that the nation “remains unprepared to step up to major power responsibilities” and that it cannot be a “dependable partner”. India repeated abstention when the UNGA exercised the ‘Uniting for Peace’ right to put forth a new resolution. This move, too, did not sit well with the US, France, and the likes. However, Russia was quick to praise India for its “independent and balanced” position. My question: Why so much furore over India’s abstention if it’s not a major power?

 

Rationalizing the fence-sitting

There is an overwhelming consensus across India’s political circles on the need to sit on the fence over the Russia-Ukraine crisis. At a time of great polarization and divisive politics in India, what led to consensus? The short answer is that, if you go by the left-right binary of political ideologies, both the factions find it hard to decry Russia. Sections of the left have traditionally harboured an aversion to the US’ hegemonic policies and regime-changing operations. The far left, with their communistic inclinations, have greater reasons to sit on the fence. The right, on the other hand, with their ultra-nationalistic approach to international affairs, does not see this conflict beyond the Bangladesh Liberation War between India and Pakistan in 1971, when Russia came to the former’s aid against the latter’s coalition led by the US and the UK.

 

Knowing full well who the aggressor is, the majority of Indians have no misgivings as to where their loyalties lie. In fact, the consensus is such that opposition leader Sonia Gandhi gave her unequivocal support to India’s non-partisan stance on the Russia-Ukraine crisis. In fact, the Congress supremo went as far as saying that the move is the rediscovery of the “Nehruvian non-alignment ideology”. It is refreshing to see such developments, especially at a time when consensus between political parties has become a rarity. While the government’s move to pander to the whims of the majority is understandable, the decision is also underpinned by geopolitical and economic interests.

 

The Eastern promises

It is about time the West stops basking in the glory of the bygone times. Fast-developing countries like India have their own interests to safeguard instead of meddling in the affairs of others. In fact, the irony of the West buying energy from Russia, and telling India not to, is not lost on its leaders. India’s interest to increase Russian energy imports at a good price point is, therefore, a timely and strategic move. In fact, after India stood its ground and called truth to power, the US has softened its criticism, with Secretary of State Blinken saying that “India has to make its own decisions.” Pakistan’s outgoing PM Imran Khan, too, has lauded India’s foreign policy, saying that “no superpower can dictate” the latter. President Joe Biden has recently proclaimed that the US could indeed help India diversify its energy sources if that meant discouraging the latter to do business with Russia.

 

For India’s part, however, taking Biden up on his offer runs into several challenges. Most importantly, Russia is India’s primary defence partner. Also, there is the China angle — India’s long-standing geopolitical dispute with the Red Dragon means that it could use a good counterweight in Russia. Moscow’s growing proximity with Beijing could be leveraged against Delhi. Erstwhile PM Imran Khan’s quick dash to Moscow at the break of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a tell-tale sign of incoming soft-power tussles in the East. If one thing is certain, China is set to emerge advantageous from this crisis. But that is not an incentive for India to cosy up to the West as it risks alienation in the East. Under this scenario, sitting on the fence was the high road, which India has dutifully embarked on.